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CONTORTING COMMON ARTICLE 3: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVISED ICRC COMMENTARY 
Michael A. Newton* 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Revised 
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention issued in 2016 advances an 
understanding of Common Article 3 that is supported neither by its plain text 
nor its negotiating history.  The ICRC Revised Commentary posits as an 
unquestioned aspect of lex lata that Common Article 3 encompasses crimes 
committed during non-international armed conflicts between members of the 
same fighting force.  This extension represents a laudable humanitarian 
impulse, yet it appears for the first time in the Revised Commentary as a self-
standing truism without regard to its potentially lamentable larger effects.  
The ICRC also embraces without caveat what appears to be an unseemly 
symbiosis with ongoing litigation in the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda.  
This short Essay describes the circularity of support between the ICRC 
and the Chambers of the ICC.  Its successive sections describe the 
problematic potential of extending the substantive coverage of Common 
Article 3 to encompass members of the same armed group who commit 
criminal acts against one another.1  In particular, the Revised Commentary 
fails to address the due process ramifications of an enlarged Common Article 
3, even as the development of the text documented by the readily available 
negotiating record warrants an alternative understanding.  Lastly, the ICRC 
position could indicate a radical shift in the very design of the field of 
international humanitarian law.2  This Essay closes by restating the 
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 1 The ICC Statute largely replicates the text of Common Article 3 in Article 8(2)(c).  The 
slight differences between the texts are the result of stylistic changes but the substantive 
protections afforded are identical.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 
8(2)(c), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].   
 2 The classic concept of “the law of war” has shifted over time and in the modern usage the 
terms “law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law” and “the laws and 
customs of war” are now used interchangeably.  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Concurrent 
Application: A Victim Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 242 (Roberta Arnold & 
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008). 
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imperative balance between military pragmatism and humanitarian 
imperatives that is preserved by the careful blending of values within the 
laws and customs of warfare.  While wholly appealing on humanitarian 
grounds, particularly on the facts presented in Ntaganda, the reconceived 
approach to Common Article 3 may well endanger the larger structure of 
international humanitarian law. The Revised ICRC Commentary omits any 
mention of these competing concerns.   
Common Article 3 represents by all accounts one of the “most important 
Articles” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3  As such, it figures prominently 
in the modern jurisprudence.4  The ICRC Commentary of 2016 explains and 
strengthens the extant jurisprudential basis for applying Common Article 3 in 
admirable ways.  The Revised ICRC Commentary does great service to the 
profession and public by providing a tour de force of the structure and law 
behind Common Article 3 as it has evolved since the 1952 publication of the 
classic Pictet Commentaries (also issued under ICRC auspices).5  In modern 
operations, the mandate for humane treatment to all persons is 
unquestionably established as one of the most important legal tenets 
restraining unfettered military discretion.  The principle of humane treatment 
without adverse distinction is explicit on the face of Common Article 3 vis-à-
vis civilians and persons who are not participating in the conflict, but flows 
through other norms to require fighters to “refrain from cruelties and 
perfidious acts also against fighters” during all armed conflicts.6  
                                                                                                                   
 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA 
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 38 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter Pictet 
Commentary on Common Article 3], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Com 
ment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1919123E0D121FEFC12563CD0041FC08. 
 4 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 166 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj00 
0303e.pdf (“Common Article 3 must be considered as a rule of customary international law.”); 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals 
Judgement, ¶ 49-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (extending 
the coverage of Common Article 3 to include rapes committed during armed conflict not of an 
international character and rejecting arguments that Common Article 3 is limited to the 
protection of property and the proper use of permitted weapons). 
 5 The Pictet Commentaries were based “primarily on the negotiating history of the 
respective treaties, as observed firsthand by the authors, and on prior practice, especially that 
of World War II.  They contain important institutional and historical knowledge and, in this 
respect, retain their value.”  Lindsey Cameron et al., The Updated Commentary on the First 
Geneva Convention – a New Tool for Generating Respect for International Humanitarian 
Law, 97  INT. REV. RED CROSS 1209, 1214 (2015).   
 6 Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-international Armed Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 592, ¶ 1203(4) (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).  
See also 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75, June 8, 1977,  
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Nevertheless, the normative structure of jus in bello exists to empower those 
in the vortex of armed conflicts to balance legitimate military needs whilst 
simultaneously achieving larger humanitarian imperatives.  In the memorable 
framing of Yoram Dinstein, “every single norm” within the laws and 
customs of armed conflict operates as “a parallelogram of forces; it confronts 
an inveterate tension between the demands of military necessity and 
humanitarian considerations, working out a compromise formula.”7  
The Revised ICRC policy position extending8 the application of Common 
Article 3 to intra-party offenses committed by participants in the conflict 
contorts its meaning and clouds the larger normative framework of the jus in 
bello.  To be clear, the ICRC Commentary asserts without support that 
normal domestic criminal law may be bypassed in favor of prosecution based 
on Common Article 3 during an armed conflict not of an international 
character when conduct proscribed by its substantive provisions has been 
committed by members of an armed group against victims fighting in the 
same military or para-military organization.  No examples of state practice or 
jurisprudence support the ICRC assertion that the humanitarian protections 
embedded in Common Article 3 may be extended to such intra-force 
offenses.  The ICRC simply cites to the ICC Prosecutor’s position in 
charging Bosco Ntaganda as evidence that such an extension is warranted.9 
Reliance on the ICC charging documents by the ICRC represents an 
aspirational statement of lex ferenda because it is divorced from tenets of 
established law and state practice.  In fact, the ICC Prosecutor pointedly 
went out of her way during her public press conference in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda to express her pride that the theory of the case 
by which the law of war encompasses “crimes committed against his own 
group” represents “an innovation that the Office of the Prosecutor will be 
                                                                                                                   
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter 
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). 
 7 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2d ed. 2010) (Professor Dinstein concludes the thought by noting that “it 
can be categorically stated that no part of” the laws and customs of warfare “overlooks 
military requirements, just as no part of [the law] loses sight of humanitarian considerations”). 
 8 Lindsey Cameron et al., Common Article 3: Conflicts not of an International Character, 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA 
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 546–547 (Jean Marie Henckaerts et al., 2d. ed. 
2016) [hereinafter Revised Commentary on Common Article 3], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ 
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C
1257F7D004BA0EC. 
 9 Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, at n.293. 
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bringing to international criminal justice.”10  Until Ntaganda, the premise 
that “the laws of war applicable in internal armed conflicts bind members of 
armed forces and armed groups vis-à-vis their opponents who share the same 
nationality” was unchallenged in academia or extant case law.11 Indeed, the 
ICRC website summarizes Common Article 3 by noting that it “requires 
humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands,” because the text functions 
like “a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential 
rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them 
applicable to conflicts not of an international character.”12 
The text of the Revised 2016 Commentary does embed an odd duality in 
that it also reflects the conventional understanding of Common Article 3 by 
noting that non-state participants in conflicts “may be prosecuted under 
domestic law for their participation in hostilities, including for acts that are 
not unlawful under humanitarian law” articles of the Conventions.13  As any 
modern practitioner recognizes, the full range of applicable human rights 
treaties also protects various dimensions of humane treatment and remains 
fully binding during non-international armed conflicts.14  This in turn means 
that differing bodies of law, along with differing judicial enforcement 
mechanisms, operate alongside each other to provide remedies for 
impermissible inhumane treatment during armed conflicts.15 
The universal practice since 1949 has been to treat participants in an 
armed conflict of a non-international character as remaining fully subject to 
the domestic criminal laws applicable either to their national jurisdictions or 
the state that would normally exercise territorially based criminal 
jurisdiction.  In other words, the conventional and long-established framing 
is that Common Article 3 instantiates fundamental humanitarian protections 
to a defined set of victims caught in the midst of armed conflicts.  The text 
plainly states that Common Article 3 prohibits acts “committed against 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities.”16  It predates the 
development of human rights treaties, and is best understood in the modern 
era as a supplementary gap-filler that creates a seamless web of basic rights 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Fatou Bensouda, Ntaganda Case Press conference of 1 Sept. 2015, min. 33:38 to 34:07, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOgZc-IgDIA. 
 11 EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 119 (2008). 
 12 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-addit 
ional-protocols. 
 13 Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 531. 
 14 See, e.g., DARAGH MURRAY, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT (2016); GERD OBERLEITNER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: LAW, PRACTICE, 
POLICY (2015). 
 15 Id. ¶¶ 1.04–1.86. 
 16 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c). 
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applicable to all armed conflicts.  The core substantive protections that flow 
in the original text of the Geneva Conventions modify the concept of 
“persons taking no active part in hostilities” by referring to crimes committed 
“with respect to the above-mentioned persons.”17  Thus, the concept of 
protecting persons “taking no active part in the hostilities” is the load-bearing 
pillar from which the humanitarian protections of Common Article 3 flow.  
Despite this textual clarity, the Revised ICRC Commentary embarks upon 
an unsupported teleological theory to innovate a broader scope of Common 
Article 3.  Relying solely on the Prosecutor’s position in the charges filed in 
Ntaganda, the Revised Commentary posits without caveat that “armed forces 
of a Party to the conflict benefit from the application of common Article 3 by 
their own Party.”18  It accordingly concludes that “[t]he fact that the trial is 
undertaken or the abuse committed by their own Party should not be a 
ground to deny such persons the protection of common Article 3.”19  As a 
textual matter, this ICRC framing misstates the central dimension of 
Common Article 3, which is to provide core protections to civilians, persons 
rendered hors de combat for any reason, and all others “taking no active part 
in hostilities.”20  The only purported justification for this dramatic 
reformulation of Common Article 3 is the premise that distinguishing 
between civilians and active participants in an armed conflict not of an 
international character is complicated due to shared nationality of all 
participants.  Hence, the text posits as a self-standing justification that 
“[l]imiting protection under common Article 3 to persons affiliated or 
perceived to be affiliated with the opposing Party is therefore difficult to 
reconcile with the protective purpose of common Article 3.”21  
The mutually reinforcing analysis between the ICRC and the ongoing 
litigation is clear upon closer examination.  In filings that predated the 
release of the ICRC Commentary, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor argued in 
Ntaganda that the charges against an alleged perpetrator22 for the rape of 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Pictet Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 3 (emphasis added).  
 18 Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 547. 
 19 Id. 
 20 M. Gandhi, Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions, 1949 in Era of International 
Criminal Tribunals, ISIL YEARBOOK OF INT’L AND REFUGEE LAWS. 
 21 Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 546. 
 22 There was extensive debate during the drafting of the Elements of Crimes for the 
International Criminal Court over the relative merits of the terms “perpetrator” or “accused.”  
Though some delegations were concerned that the term “perpetrator” would undermine the 
presumption of innocence, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) ultimately 
agreed to use it in the Elements after including a comment in the introductory chapeau that 
“the term ‘perpetrator’ is neutral as to guilt or innocence.”  See Rep. of the Prep. Comm’n for 
the Int’l Crim. Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), in KNÜT 
DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 14 (2002). 
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child soldiers and the war crimes of sexual slavery against those same 
persons refers to “children under the age of 15 years of age who were 
members of the UPC/FPLC [using the titles of the insurgent non-state actor 
forces]” were warranted under Common Article 3.23  The ICC Prosecutor 
amended the original charges against Ntaganda to include violations of 
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) on the basis of  rape and sexual slavery committed within 
the rebel force against conscripted child soldiers within that force.24  On its 
face, Article 8(2)(e)(vi) criminalizes a variety of acti rei that encompass a 
wide range of sexual violence “also constituting a serious violation of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”25  Pre-Trial Chamber II 
confirmed those charges by reasoning that because the Rome Statute 
specifically criminalizes conscription or recruitment of child soldiers, 
the mere membership of children under the age of 15 years in 
an armed group cannot be considered as determinative proof of 
direct/active participation in hostilities, considering that their 
presence in the armed group is specifically proscribed under 
international law in the first place.  Indeed, to hold that children 
under the age of 15 years lose the protection afforded to them 
by IHL merely by joining an armed group, whether as a result 
of coercion or other circumstances, would contradict the very 
rationale underlying the protection afforded to such children 
against recruitment and use in hostilities.26  
Reflecting this stance, the drafters of the Revised ICRC Commentary 
subsequently cited the Prosecutor’s position and provided only the oft-cited 
pablum from the Nicaragua case in the International Court of Justice that 
Common Article 3 provides protections of such fundamental character that 
they reflect the “minimum yardstick” of treatment applicable in all armed 
conflicts.27 Common Article 3 on its face reflects basic considerations of 
humanity, which is reflected by the extension of protections to “any time and 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Prosecution Response to the 
“Application on behalf of Mr. Ntaganda challenging the jurisdiction  of the Court in response 
to Counts 6 and 9 of the Document Containing the Charges, ¶ 6 (Sept. 11, 2015) (emphasis 
added), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?docNo=icc-01/04-02/06-818. 
 24 Id. at Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 
¶ 44 (July 13, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07506.PDF. 
 25 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(e)(vi). 
 26 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor 
Against Bosco Ntaganda, ¶ 78 (June 9, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2012.07 
506.pdf [hereinafter Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges Decision]. 
 27 Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 356. 
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in any place whatsoever.”28  For a provision seeking to maximize respect for 
human dignity and the fundamental human rights of persons adversely 
affected by armed conflicts not of an international character, this breadth is 
both logical and wholly legitimate.  
The International Court of Justice and other tribunals have been clear in 
the decades since the 1949 adoption of Common Article 3 that its character 
and coverage are fundamental in terms of providing a baseline of 
humanitarian protection.  Extending this tenet, Trial Chamber VI opined that 
prohibitions on rape represent jus cogens norms, which necessarily implies 
that such conduct is “prohibited at all times, both in times of peace and 
during armed conflicts, and against all persons, irrespective of any legal 
status.”29 That conclusion is inarguable on its face, but the very fact that 
such conduct is criminally proscribed is quite a different question from a 
precise assessment of the circumstances and persons that benefit from the 
admittedly fundamental protections of Common Article 3.  In its 
authoritative Revised Commentary, the ICRC provided no intellectual 
buttressing for the novel proposition that Common Article 3 extends to intra-
force offenses, notwithstanding the fact that no international or domestic 
tribunal or court has so opined in the sixty-seven-year history of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.  
The ICRC simply relied upon the Prosecutor’s framing of that 
“innovation” in Ntaganda, along with the implicit inference that the 
extension of humanitarian protections warranted the use of the laws of war 
rather than any other normally applicable provisions of domestic criminal 
law.  It is telling to close readers that there is no justification provided by the 
ICRC drafters for such an expansion of Article 3. Simultaneous rumors in 
The Hague at the time of this writing of deliberate coordination between the 
ICC Office of the Prosecutor and the ICRC do little to disquiet the sense 
that there is something untoward in this unilateral extension of previously 
accepted understandings.  In fact, following the release of the Revised ICRC 
Commentary, Trial Chamber VI denied renewed jurisdictional challenges 
raised by the defense by relying in part on the observation that the ICRC 
perspective is “noteworthy” and “consistent with humanitarian principles” 
that are integral to the law of armed conflict.30  
The circularity of sources is striking in that the ICRC relied upon the 
filings of the ICC Prosecutor as its primary source of authority, and the ICC 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United 
States, Merits, Judgement 1986, I.C.J. Rep. 14 ¶¶ 218–219. 
 29 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Trial Chamber VI, 
Second Decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of 
Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 52 (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi-int/CourtRecords/CR2017_00011. 
 30 Id. ¶ 51. 
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Trial Chamber in turn relied upon the purportedly authoritative ICRC 
position as the capstone of its legal analysis.  In filing its revised charging 
document for a warrant of arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, the OTP relied upon the 
provisions of Article 8(2)(e) rather than Common Article 3 (Article 8(2)(c)) 
in charging the sexual offenses committed intra-force against the conscripted 
child soldiers.31  The Pre-Trial Chamber referenced broader prohibitions 
found in other parts of international humanitarian law such as Protocol II32 
and injected Common Article 3 into its analysis by hypothesizing that the 
“sexual character of these crimes, which involve elements of force/coercion 
or the exercise of rights of ownership, logically preclude active participation 
in hostilities at the same time.”33  
However, Pre-Trial Chamber II implicitly rejected any presumption that 
Common Article 3 provides sufficient stand-alone authority to sustain intra-
force offenses.  The operative paragraph of the Ntaganda Confirmation of 
Charges expressly states that  
the Chamber finds that UPC/FPLC child soldiers under the age 
of 15 years continue to enjoy protection under IHL from acts of 
rape and sexual slavery, as reflected in article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Statute.  The Chamber is, therefore, not barred from exercising 
jurisdiction over the crimes in counts 6 and 9.34  
Despite the fact that the ICC jurisdiction was explicitly grounded in other 
provisions applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character, the 
Revised ICRC Commentary subsequently relied upon Ntaganda as the only 
referenced authority for expanding the normative scope of Common Article 
3.  In its early 2017 ruling on a second challenge to ICC jurisdiction, Trial 
Chamber VI buttressed its own analysis by relying on the ICRC position to 
conclude that “persons alleged to have been ‘child soldiers’ . . . are to be 
considered as ‘members’ of this armed force at the relevant time.”35  Its 
penultimate conclusion that “members of the same armed force are not per se 
excluded as potential victims of war crimes of rape and sexual slavery” is 
based on the broader protections applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts as well as the wholly unprecedented and factually unnecessary 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Decision on the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58, ¶ 44 (July 13, 2012), https://www. 
icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07506.PDF. 
 32 Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 77–78, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04750.pdf. 
 33 Id. ¶ 79. 
 34 Id. ¶ 80. 
 35 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Second Decision on the Defence’s 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 53 (Jan. 4, 2017).   
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extension to combatants participating in an international armed conflict 
governed by the provisions of Article 8(2)(b)(xxii).36   
Finally, while the ICC Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s 
findings with respect to the second jurisdictional challenge on June 15, 2017, 
its decision notably fails to provide specific legal authority for an expanded 
interpretation of Common Article 3’s plain textual scope.  The Appeals 
Chamber noted the ICRC Commentary finding that Common Article 3 could 
be stretched to protect members of armed forces from offenses committed by 
the armed force to which they belong, but observed that its supporting 
sources were “limited and include a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in this 
very case.”37  The Appeals Chamber implicitly reaffirmed the textual 
limitations by noting in dicta that “Common Article 3 provides for 
unqualified protection against inhumane treatment irrespective of a person’s 
affiliation, requiring only that the persons were “taking no active part in 
hostilities at the material time.”38  The legal substance of the Appeals 
Chamber rests on the finding that “international humanitarian law does not 
contain a general rule that categorically excludes members of an armed 
group from protection against crimes committed by the same armed 
group.”39  This finding in turn warranted the legal conclusion that the 
“established framework of international law” does not preclude charges for 
intra-force offenses under the provisions of article 8(2)(b)(xii) and article 
8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.”40 The Appeals Chamber’s decision is 
notable because it held that the so-called “Status Requirements” of article 
8(2)(a)(which replicate the grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions) or of article 8(2)(c)(replicated Common Article 3 as noted 
above) do not apply to charges under the other war crimes provisions of the 
Rome Statute.  In other words, the Appeals Chamber expressly grounded its 
reasoning on the contradistinction between the grave breach provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3 which both “make explicit 
reference to Status Requirements.”41 
Thus, at the time of this writing, the Revised ICRC Commentary is the 
only extant authority that posits the proposition that the core provisions of 
Common Article 3 are sufficiently expansible to cover crimes committed 
intra-force during non-international armed conflicts as a blanket matter.  
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. ¶ 54. 
    37 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06 OA5, Appeals Chamber, 
Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Ntaganda against the “Second Decision on the Defence’s 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 61 (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-02/06-1962. 
    38 Id. ¶ 60. 
    39 Id. ¶ 63.  
    40 Id. ¶ 67. 
    41 Id. ¶ 46. 
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There is no hint of state practice or broader opinio juris to support that 
assertion by the ICRC.  The use of other provisions of the Rome Statute in 
lieu of article 8(2)(c) to prosecute perpetrators who committed crimes of 
sexual violence against child soldiers who were conscripted into a non-State 
irregular armed force is indeed satisfying on a human level.  However, the 
ICRC provides no support whatever to sustain its policy position that an 
extension of Common Article 3 protections (which limit its scope to persons 
taking no active part in hostilities, as noted above) is warranted, or why such 
a significant reconceptualization of Article 3 is useful to the field (apart from 
the inference that the intent is to assist the ICC Prosecutor).  There is no 
explanation at all why charges under applicable domestic law or the parallel 
crimes against humanity provisions are insufficient to protect the 
fundamental rights of child soldiers when warranted by the evidence.  
Phrased another way, the ICRC provides no support whatever for its 
revolutionary extension of Common Article 3 to provide protections as a 
matter of established international law to persons beyond its explicit textual 
limits who are “taking no active part in hostilities.”  
This Essay concludes by summarizing the potentially problematic aspects 
occasioned by such an extension.  Firstly, international law is clear that a 
perpetrator can never be convicted “based upon a norm which an accused 
could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts, and this 
norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could engage his 
criminal responsibility.”42  It is well established that “customary international 
law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3.”43  
The Rome Statute itself reflects the core precept nullem crimen sine lege 
with the requirement in Article 22 that the concept of a crime sufficient to 
impute individual responsibility “shall be strictly construed and shall not be 
extended by analogy.  In [the] case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour (sic) of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.”44  In practice, this standard means that “that the conduct in 
question is regarded as criminal under that body of law and that individual 
criminal responsibility may be imposed in case of breach.”45  Thus, it should 
have been dispositive for ICRC purposes that the ICC Elements of Crimes 
specifies that Common Article 3 protects only victims that “were either hors 
de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, ¶ 193 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the former Yugoslavia, Nov. 29, 2002).  
 43 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Oct. 
2, 1995). 
 44 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2). 
 45 Vasiljević, supra note 42 (emphasis added). 
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taking no active part in hostilities.”46  The ICRC simply ignored the due 
process ramifications of imposing its policy preference in extending 
Common Article 3 to cover intra-party offenses. 
Similarly, the ICRC provided no justification for its position in the 
Revised Commentary that the substantive scope of Common Article 3 should 
depart so radically from the textual limits that were so important to the 
original negotiations.  In fact, many states were hesitant to adopt Article 3 
because of its potential for protecting criminals in civil war or other types of 
conflict. In light of this reluctance, it should be viewed narrowly, 
notwithstanding the modern teleological impulse to extend its coverage to all 
persons at all times.  To reiterate, other overlapping provisions of law 
proscribe the acts of perpetrators committed against members of their own 
armed forces, so the notion that expansion of Common Article 3 is required 
to fill a lacunae in enforcement is not supported in practice.  It is worth 
recalling that the original ICRC position during the drafting of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, soundly rejected by the actual delegates, sought to 
craft Article 3 to simply mirror the range of protections applicable to 
participants in international armed conflicts. Contrary to the bland ICRC 
assertion in the Revised Commentary, the deliberate intention of Article 3 at 
the time of its drafting was not to provide the broadest possible coverage of 
protections to all persons with a nexus to an armed conflict of a non-
international character.    
The travaux provide three reasons why the ICRC extension is 
unsupportable based on the development of Common Article 3.  Firstly, 
delegates were primarily concerned over what types of opponents would 
receive the newly crafted protections.  At the beginning of the discussion of 
Common Article 3 in the Joint Committee, France expressed concerns that 
civilians on the opposing side in a civil war would be entitled to receive 
overly generous protection from the proposed article.47  The French 
delegation argued that including insurgents within the scope of Common 
Article 3 would undermine the sovereignty of the state and that the text 
should make it impossible for insurgents to “claim the protection of the 
Convention under a mask of politics or any other pretext.”48  Greece echoed 
the concern for protecting state sovereignty by stating that there was a danger 
that rebels would be entitled to the protections of prisoners of war and would 
                                                                                                                   
 46 KNÜT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
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 47 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1949, VOL. II, SECTION B10 (Federal 
Political Department Berne 1949), https://www.loc. gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Dipl-Conf-
1949-Final_Vol-2-B.pdf [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTIONS FINAL DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 
RECORD]. 
 48 Id. 
524  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 45:513 
 
not be able to be charged for their crimes.49  While some delegations (inter 
alia Romania) argued that Article 3 should have the broadest possible 
application, this view was not shared by the majority of the delegates.50  
Most of the delegates believed that the Article should be narrowly applied to 
those opposing forces that were organized and professional rather than 
bandits or anarchists in order to preserve the sovereign flexibility of the 
territorial state.51  
Secondly, the debates show that Common Article 3 as adopted was not 
intended to provide the broadest possible umbrella of humanitarian 
protections.  Russia proposed an amendment that would have given 
protection to all types of enemies and would have given prisoner of war 
status to any opposing force.52  This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected 
by twenty-five votes to nine, with three abstentions.53  During these debates, 
the British delegation stated that “participating in hostilities” would apply to 
opposing forces who had started an illegal war.54  The UK was clear 
however, in claiming that the protection was afforded only to opposing 
forces and not to members of one’s own military force.55  The record of 
negotiations makes plain that the text was meant to protect only those 
members of an opposing force.56  
Finally, the overarching goal of the delegations was to preserve state 
sovereignty by reserving the ability to prosecute criminals under extant 
domestic laws.  For example, the Burma delegation argued that adoption of 
Common Article 3 would be “taking away” from the “legal machinery” of 
the state to “maintain the security of its population and the prosperity of the 
State . . . It is also not the object of the Conference to intervene in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”57  In response, the 
Russian delegation proposed that all of the Conventional protections should 
apply in all conflicts and that a state should have no power to prosecute 
crimes during an NIAC.58  This was overwhelmingly rejected, and with it the 
ICRC preference lost any salience.59  Thus, Article 3 was specifically 
intended to apply only to opposing forces, while preserving the full 
prosecutorial discretion of the domestic state.  
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The Swiss delegation argued that Article 3 strikes the perfect balance 
between a state’s sovereignty and humanitarian protections because it 
preserves the ability of the “legitimate government whose duty it is, in a non-
international war, to compel rebels and insurgents to respect the national law 
of the country.”60  In light of the intentional design of Common Article 3, 
and the clearly expressed preference of the delegates for a narrow application 
of its protections, the Revised ICRC Commentary offers no support for its 
policy-based assertion that the text may be extended to intra-force offenses.  
The lingering whiff of an implicit interdependence between the ICRC and 
the ICC Prosecutor’s Ntaganda filings is not dispelled by any evidence from 
the travaux préparatoires. 
Finally, the ICRC position with respect to Common Article 3 represents 
something of an axial shift in the design of the entire field of jus in bello.  It 
cannot be overemphasized that the laws and customs of warfare balance 
humanitarian objectives with the perfectly legitimate need to accomplish the 
mission.  The gründnorm for the entire scope of the “laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts” (to borrow the language of the Rome Statute 
in Article 8) is to build a careful balance between the ability of practitioners 
to lawfully accomplish the military mission in a manner that, to the greatest 
degree possible, respects the enduring value of humanitarian considerations.  
Michael Waltzer is entirely correct in his conclusion that belligerent armies 
are “not entitled to do anything that is or seems to them necessary to win 
wars.  They are subject to a set of restrictions that rest in part on the 
agreements of states but that also have an independent foundation in moral 
principle.”61  At the same time, the normative standards of jus in bello that 
are intentionally designed to protect civilians and serve larger humanitarian 
goals “reflect the inherent recognition of authority to employ such combat 
power for the prompt and efficient defeat of an enemy.”62 
The ICRC appears to elevate humanitarian concerns as the dominant 
leitmotif of jus in bello in a manner that would represent a radical shift in its 
intended function.  While international humanitarian law63 contains 
numerous express prohibitions subject to no caveats, combatants properly 
exercise what the ICRC has labeled a “fairly broad margin of judgment.”64  
Therein lies the completely appropriate and distinctive permissiveness of the 
laws and customs of armed conflict.  For example, “effective advance 
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warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, 
unless circumstances do not permit” (emphasis added).65  
As a logical extension of the duality embedded within jus in bello, 
medical care is due those in military custody only “to the fullest extent 
practicable and with the least possible delay.”66  Other obligations are often 
couched in aspirational terms such as “whenever possible”67 or “as widely as 
possible.”68  Still more duties are couched in less than strident terms such as 
“shall endeavour”69 or the duty to “take all practical precautions.”70  There 
are also numerous express exceptions permitted for reasons of “imperative 
military necessity.”71  International law is clear that those who order military 
strikes must “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be 
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”72 and “take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”73  Even in that evaluation, 
it is important to note that the benchmark for “feasible” is measured from the 
reasonable war-fighter’s point of view in a manner that deliberately 
incorporates the twin foundations of jus in bello.  The United Kingdom 
clarified the term in its official treaty practice as follows: “The United 
Kingdom understands the term ‘feasible’ as used in the Protocol to mean that 
which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.”74  The United States has also adopted a similar 
understanding of the term “feasible” in this jus in bello usage.75 
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The key point that the Revised ICRC Commentary failed to acknowledge 
much less persuasively address is that the proper balance between 
humanitarian and military imperatives is intentionally and deeply integrated 
into the law itself.  Conversely, courts and commentators must be clear when 
jus in bello applies or operates to displace other legally relevant criminal 
norms.  As the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted in Kunarac, the 
“determination of what constitutes a war crime is therefore dependent on the 
development of the laws and customs of war at the time when an act charged 
in an indictment was committed.”76  This is why the second circumstantial 
element that is embedded in every war crime specified in the Rome Statute 
requires evidence that “the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances 
that established the existence of an armed conflict.”77  In other words, there 
is a fundamental due process right that convictions only be grounded in the 
perpetrator’s knowledge that the jus in bello is applicable and should provide 
the signposts for acceptable conduct.  
Common Article 3 is part of the larger fabric of jus in bello, and on its 
face deliberately preserved the applicability of domestic criminal sanctions to 
persons participating in non-international armed conflicts.  Just as individual 
participants cannot lawfully inject individualized rationalizations as authority 
for ignoring jus in bello norms, the ICRC ought not negate the interlocking 
duality of provisions applicable to the conduct of non-international armed 
conflict.  While superficially satisfying on a humanitarian basis, 
superimposing the humanitarian imperatives of jus in bello as its dominant 
component risks rupture to the carefully negotiated structure.  The Revised 
ICRC policy position extending the application of Common Article 3 to 
intra-party offenses committed by participants in the conflict contorts its 
meaning and clouds the larger normative framework of the field. 
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